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1  Social Robots
For some time now robots have left the confines of industry to work more closely 
together with humans: “cobotics” is now a common buzzword. Robots of a new 
technological generation are currently on the threshold of everyday, practical use 
in the service, health and education sectors. The International Federation of Robots 
(IFR) predicts that autonomous mobile robots (AMRs) in the logistics sector, for 
example, will anually increase by 30% between 2020 and 2023.1
As robots become more mobile thanks to sensors, actuators and artificial intel-
ligence, enabling them to move in a more complex environment, direct interaction 
with people in an everyday setting becomes increasingly normal. As their autonomy 
increases, they can independently work through hierarchies of goals and are less 
under ongoing human control and intervention. For example, autonomous robots 
have been assisting in shopping malls in Japan and Korea for some time now; in 
Korea, thousands of such robots work as teaching assistants in kindergartens (Han 
et al., 2015), and the Henn-na Hotel in Nagasaki has become the first hotel to rely 
extensively on robots to perform the tasks normally performed by hotel employees 
such as welcoming guests at the reception, providing information, organising the 
storage of luggage and taking care of the check-in and check-out services.
As part of this “mobile robot revolution”, social robots have established them-
selves as a distinct group. Conceptually, these are robots that are specifically 
equipped with social-communicative functions, since their primary task is to react 
to humans as social and communicative beings and to refer particularly to these 
essential facets of human existence. Social robots should ideally recognize the social 
needs of humans together with the associated feelings and thoughts and respond 
appropriately according to their respective roles.
 * Georg Gasser 
 georg.gasser@kthf.uni-augsburg.de
1 Faculty of Catholic Theology & Department of Philosophy, University of Augsburg, Augsburg, 
Germany
1 https:// ifr. org/ ifr- press- relea ses/ news/ mobile- robots- revol ution ize- indus try (from August 5, 2021).
330 G. Gasser 
1 3
The implementation of this aim seems particularly urgent because the current 
demographic trend in industrialised countries means that the number of older people 
who will be dependent on care in one form or another will rise rapidly in the coming 
years. At the same time, however, the number of available caregivers is constantly 
decreasing, which is why social robots are seen as one way to respond to this wor-
risome development. In addition to robots that cover the area of medical care (e.g. 
monitoring blood pressure, detecting falls, encouraging physical exercise...) and 
everyday care and hygiene (washing, bathing...), it is also crucial that the cognitive-
social needs of the persons to be cared for are not neglected (playing games, mem-
ory training, providing entertainment and companionship...).
The successful performance of such tasks does not necessarily have to be accom-
panied by a humanoid form. A washing robot for the care sector can also be equipped 
with communicative functions and thus also react to social needs in the context of 
personal hygiene. The social robots most frequently encountered in practice, such as 
Nao and Pepper, can clearly be classified as non-human in their appearance.
Previous experience with these robots suggests that appropriate interactions 
may well promote human communication and social skills. For example, AIBO, a 
touch-sensitive and interacting pet introduced by Sony more than two decades ago, 
has been successfully tested as an activating toy for the elderly. Similarly, Paro, a 
Japanese companion robot shaped like a baby harp seal, assists elderly people and 
patients. Paro responds to petting with body movements as well as by opening and 
closing its eyes and making sounds. In general, people like to cuddle, stroke, and 
talk with Paro like they would with a real animal. The use of Paro is analogous to 
real therapy animals, of which empirical studies show that interaction with them can 
help to lower blood pressure, cushion depressive phases, reduce the subjective feel-
ing of pain, improve the phase of recovery or bring someone out of social self-isola-
tion. For example, there is also evidence that Paro can reduce feelings of loneliness 
and social isolation in retirement houses or alleviate emotional agitation, stress and 
depressive phases in psychogeriatric patients and patients suffering from dementia 
(Jøranson et al., 2015; Góngora Alonso et al., 2019). Thus, in the fields of health- 
and social care, such robots can be seen as a useful tool: They improve existing solu-
tions or allow therapists and caregivers new areas of application.
As social robots come closer to their users than previous machines due to their 
communicative and social abilities in the personal sphere, a whole range of ethical 
questions arise: Can social robots be a social counterpart in a genuine way, perhaps 
even take on the role of a human friend? Is it better to have a robot as “Ersatz-
partner” than to have to live in loneliness? If the artificial seal Paro has a positive 
influence on elderly people, do they have to be informed (if this is possible at all) 
that it is an artificial and not a real animal? How are personal rights protected when 
interaction with a robot continuously collects data to adapt and improve the interac-
tion? Are we in danger of increasingly delegating interpersonal contacts in nursing 
homes to robots? Are there interpersonal areas that should be off-limits to robots? Is 
there such a thing as respect that is appropriate towards robots or do they even enjoy 
a certain moral status?
In my introductory reflections, I do not want to go further into these or similar 
questions. They would go beyond the scope of this introduction and, in addition, 
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some of them will be discussed in detail in the papers that follow. Therefore, I would 
like to focus on one crucial anthropological issue, which concerns our embodiment: 
We are essentially embodied beings and the structure of our body shapes deeply our 
mind, that is, how we perceive ourselves, others and the world. This fact also affects 
our perception of robots, especially those designed in their appearance and behav-
iours as human-like as possible.
2  Embodiment and Social Cognition
The thesis that consciousness is intimately linked to our biological constitution 
has become a commonplace of contemporary Philosophy of Mind. The so-called 
Philosophy of Embodiment can be understood as a broad research programme that 
revolves around the central thesis that both the cognitive and mental states and pro-
cesses of living beings are intrinsically embodied and as such essentially embedded 
in an environment (e. g. Haugeland, 1998; Varela et al., 1991).
This claim corresponds to the phenomenological insight that our body is not sim-
ply an instrument controlled and moved by the mind, similar to a captain steering 
an airplane. Rather, the concrete nature of the body and its being embedded in a 
surrounding environment essentially shapes our mental life. A body is not simply 
a body with which I am connected in a causal-external way, but I experience the 
body directly as something subjectively accessible, which is present in perceiving, 
feeling, thinking and acting and which characterizes the way I am “in the world”. I 
may regard my body as “a thing among things” but nevertheless my body as a body 
occupies a unique position vis-à-vis me in that I cannot distance myself from it as 
I do from other things (Husserl, 1973, p. 162). I can put other things away, while 
my body is always with me. I experience my body as a living body (Leib), that is, 
“as something directly alive and connected to me, and as such it has a fundamen-
tally different kind of experience for me than all other bodies have for me” (Husserl, 
2008, p. 615).
We do neither encounter minds that are not embodied nor agents that are not 
interacting with the world through their bodies. We are, as Alva Noe puts it, not in 
our head but interacting with our environment as “distributed, dynamically spread-
out, world-involving beings” (Noe, 2009, p. 9).
These considerations have direct relevance to the way we understand social cog-
nition and interpersonal interaction. Traditional accounts of theory of mind, for 
instance, have it that there is a gap between the mental life of two persons and this 
gap is bridged by some kind of cognitive processes in one mind providing the means 
to infer the activities going on in the other mind. Thus, the mind of another person 
is not directly perceptible but concealed by the body. What one needs to bridge this 
gap is either a kind of theory about other minds or a kind of simulation of other 
minds or a combination thereof that will permit an inferential form of mind-reading 
or mind-simulating.
Without going into the details of these approaches, it should be obvious that the 
body plays a subordinate role here. The role it has, at best, is to be the source of evi-
dence for constructing the relevant inference. Social cognition is characterised as a 
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third-person process where one person is observing the behaviour of another person 
and then drawing corresponding inferences about her inner mental life hidden away.
The direct social cognition account, instead, argues that social cognition and 
interpersonal interaction takes places directly and not via inferences because the 
mind is usually something directly accessible. The idea is that if body and mind are 
intimately interconnected, then the body of another person provides us direct access 
to his or her mind: The posture, movements, face, voice, gestures or skin tones are 
expressions of a person’s mind. Ludwig Wittgenstein highlights this point when he 
writes: 
Look into someone else’s face, and see the consciousness in it, and a particular 
shade of consciousness. You see on it, in it, joy, indifference, interest, excite-
ment, torpor, and so on. … Do you look into yourself in order to recognise the 
fury in his face? (Wittgenstein, 1967, p. 229)
 This is not to say that we never draw on the aforementioned models in our social 
interactions, nor that we are always able to correctly capture the mental states of 
another person. The claim is rather that in most of our encounters in everyday life, 
direct perception delivers a significant amount of important information for under-
standing others and for being able to interact successfully with others.
This approach receives additional support from studies in developmental psychol-
ogy, which indicate that already infants automatically attune to facial expression and 
voices with a mimetic response (Schilbach et al., 2008). Even before the first year 
of life, children are able to perceive various body movements as meaningful and 
goal-directed (Senju et al., 2006). These capacities do not require advanced cogni-
tive abilities such as making inferences or simulations, which infants at that young 
age simply lack; rather, they are perceptual capacities that run automatically and are 
highly stimulus-driven. Without wanting to go into further developmental steps, it 
should only be noted at this point that these abilities are not lost in later develop-
ment, but are supplemented by other higher-level cognitive abilities (a good over-
view provides Gallagher, 2008).
In short, we are in a position to interact with and to understand others in terms 
of their (contextualised) bodily expressions, gestures, vocal intonations and move-
ments long before we are able to theorise, simulate, reflect upon or predict the men-
tal states of others. Our interpersonal interaction is essentially perception-based 
because our minds are embodied and therefore, thanks to the body, the mental life of 
others becomes accessible to us.
3  Humanoid Robots and Social Interaction
Already 50 years ago a positive relationship between humanoid robots and feelings 
of comfort with them was proposed. Findings suggested, however, a steep dip in 
comfort when robots looked almost but not perfectly human, for instance, because 
of an odd way of moving (Mori, 1970). This dip is called the uncanny valley and it 
highlights negative feelings of unease, eeriness or even hostility towards human-like 
robots which are difficult to distinguish from real humans.
333
1 3
The Dawn of Social Robots: Anthropological and Ethical Issues 
In literature, this phenomenon has already been described by the German writer 
E.T.A. Hoffmann (1776–1822) in the short story “The Automata”, when one of the 
two protagonists, Lewis, is confronted with the talking Turk, an automaton with a 
very human appearance, and says: “For me, the very association of a human person 
with dead figures that imitate humanity in their formation and movement has some-
thing oppressive, uncanny, even horrifying about it. I can imagine that it would be 
possible to make figures dance artificially and nimbly by means of a mechanism hid-
den inside, and that they would have to perform a dance together with human beings, 
turning and twisting in all kinds of ways, so that the living dancer would take hold 
of the dead wooden dancer and swing with her. Would you be able to bear the sight 
for a minute without inner horror?” (my translation from the German original)
Precise information on the extent of the uncanny valley effect varies, as do 
the particular (outer) appearance and (inner) functioning of a robot that lead to 
an increase or decrease in the required humanlikness (e. g. Müller et  al., 2021; 
Rosenthal-von der Pütten & Krämer, 2014; Zhang et al., 2020).
The “category uncertainty hypothesis” suggests that an important cause for 
unease towards human-like robots could be caused by category uncertainty, that is, 
the uncertainty of whether it is a human being or not. Conflicting cues that make a 
clear categorisation difficult may cause us to feel uncomfortable and therefore adopt 
negative reactions towards the problematic object (Wang et  al., 2015). The “mind 
perception hypothesis” can be seen as a variant of the “category uncertainty hypoth-
esis” because it proposes that humanoid robots are uncanny because they are so real-
istic that we tend to ascribe to these robots mental capacities such as feelings and 
thoughts although we are convinced that these capacities are unique characteristics 
of complex animals (Gray & Wegner, 2012).
Regardless of the concrete differentiation of these hypotheses, both point out that 
a no longer given clear distinction between humans on the one hand and robots on 
the other undermines our self-image and identity as human person, which results in 
the indicated negative reactions.
The brief remarks on embodiment support this view, since due to the humanoid 
appearance of the robot (“the embodiment of the robot”) those stimuli are given that 
automatically activate those systems in us that are relevant for social interaction pro-
cesses. However, at the same time we perceive other features in the robot that speak 
against the activation of these processes or we are even aware that we are dealing 
with an entity lacking any form of mental life. There are also corresponding findings 
from developmental psychology that suggest that infants react with stress or fear 
to objects such as hoover robots that can move on their own but do not have feet or 
other locomotion organs, since the fundamental distinction between living beings 
that can move on their own and non-living objects that have to be moved from the 
outside is suspended. In these cases, it is assumed that infants have a corresponding 
basic categorisation of self-moving living and non-self-moving non-living entities, 
which is not based upon theory-driven ascription, since the corresponding mental 
prerequisites for doing so do not yet exist at this young age.
In addition, humans have a tendency to see the world through an anthropomor-
phic filter. When trying to interact with a new and unfamiliar entity, human use the 
knowledge about themselves as a basis for interpreting and predicting the behaviour 
334 G. Gasser 
1 3
of this entity. This tendency increases with the humanlikness of an entity and is fur-
ther nurtured though our social needs. Evidence suggests that our social nature leads 
us to anthropomorphize humanoid objects more in  situations of social loneliness 
than in situations where our social needs are largely met (Eyseel & Reich, 2013).
If these assumptions are correct, then, at least in the health and care sectors, it 
might be advisable to design social robots in such a way that they can be clearly 
distinguished from humans (there may be other areas of application where the best 
possible approximation to humans is indicated, but I am leaving this question aside 
here). Ultimately, the appearance of a robot also has a specific purpose to fulfil and 
in this area of application it should not be about replacing human carers or making 
the people being cared for believe that they are interacting with real human people. 
Studies suggest that the appearance of a robot should be appropriate to the tasks it 
has to perform: For example, animal-like, fluffy robots are preferred when address-
ing social needs and emotions, while more machine-like robots are appealing for 
administering medication, lifting or helping with washing (Broadbent et al., 2012).
Moreover, also non-humanoid robots can accommodate our embodied and agen-
tive nature as they encourage interaction with them. As part of our environment, 
social robots offer opportunities for interaction and touch as basic channels to trans-
mit feelings, affects and needs that are only available to a reduced extent when robots 
are not physically but only digitally present as avatars or via a screen. Humans inter-
act more with a physically present robot than with digital representations of it, as 
this obviously corresponds to our embodied and social nature. For instance, studies 
indicate that people experience their interactions more engaging and effective and 
are also more compliant to follow instructions when the social robot is present than 
when they merely have to interact with the same software and voice on a screen 
(Mann et al., 2015; Deng et al., 2019).
4  Conclusions
Predictions by experts indicate that robots will become a natural part of our environ-
ment in the coming decades. Robots are already proving useful in taking over impor-
tant tasks in the healthcare and social sector, thereby relieving human employees.
Engineers often strive to make robots look as human-like as possible so that we 
break down barriers to interaction and feel comfortable in their presence. However, 
the uncanny valley effect indicates that the presence of humanoid robots can also 
evoke feelings of discomfort, eeriness and threat. I have pointed out that our social 
nature plays an important role in this context. As socially oriented creatures, we are 
fundamentally interested in interaction and cooperation, which requires the reliable 
ability to understand the other side to a certain degree. Robots that are too humanoid 
are likely to prevent us from such an understanding or they make us feel insecure, 
which has a negative effect on our willingness to interact.
Our social nature is shaped in a significant way by our embodied constitution. 
Our embodiment determines the way we see and interpret ourselves and the world 
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Robots principally represent additional possibilities for interaction, and if these 
robots can be clearly distinguished from humans, we do not experience this inter-
action in most situations as negative. We prefer physically present robots to com-
parable software counterparts because of our agentive and social orientation. Non-
humanoid robots also indicate that robots are not meant to replace human interaction 
partners, but rather represent an additional complementary role in the field of social 
interaction and can support and promote it. Thus, while it is seen as positive that 
robots are able to demonstrate a certain degree of functional autonomy or express 
verbally understanding for the human counter-part or explain why they behave in a 
given way, moderation in the endowment of all-too-human attributes is key if one 
wishes to avoid negative reactions.
Ultimately, the central questions in the context of the further development of 
social robots and our relationships with them are of a philosophical nature: Does 
blurring the line between humans and robots challenge our personal identity? What 
are our purposes in designing robots that are as human-like as possible? Do we per-
haps see in such robots a more ideal form of our own nature? If so, what does this 
tell us about ourselves and our relationships with others? These and similar ques-
tions address the articles included in this special issue of Minds and Machines.
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